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UNION REQUESTS FOR INFORMATION IN THE
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING PROCESS
In recent years it has become an increasingly common practice for
labor unions to request a variety of information from management. These
requests have been primarily for information concerning the employees
in the bargaining unit represented by the union.' In addition, unions have
sought data on the employer's financial status 2 and, at times, the results of
management research studies.3 The justification asserted for these requests
is the necessity of such information for intelligent employee representation
in bargaining 4 and for proper policing of the contract once negotiated.5
THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE BARGAINING CONCEPT
Although the practice of exchanging information is well established
in some industries," many employers have been unwilling to comply with
such union requests. Consequently, some unions have sought the aid of
the National Labor Relations Board to compel disclosure, arguing that it
is essential to the bargaining process. Whether bargaining requires such
1. See, e.g., NLRB v. F. W. Woolworth Co., 235 F.2d 319 (9th Cir. 1956),
denying enforcement to 109 ,N.L.R.B. 196 (1954); Utica Observer-Dispatch v. NLRB,
229 F.2d 575 (2d Cir. 1956), enforcing 111 N.L.R.B. 58 (1955); NLRB v. Yawman
& Erbe Mfg. Co., 187 F.2d 947 (2d Cir. 1951), enforcing 89 N.L.R.B. 881 (1950);
Aluminum Ore Co. v. NLRB, 131 F2d 485 (7th Cir.), nodifying and enforcing 39
N.L.R.B. 1286 (1942). See also Card, Information Requests in Collective Bargaining, 6
LAB. L.J. 777 (1955) ; Sherman, Employer's Obligation To Produce Data for Collec-
tive Bargaining, 35 MiNN. L. Riv. 24 (1950).
2. See Truitt Mfg. Co., 110 N.L.R.B. 856 (1954), enforcement denied, 224 F2d
869 (4th Cir. 1955), rev'd, 351 U.S. 149 (1956); Jacobs Mfg. Co., 94 N.L.R.B. 1214
(1951), enforcenent granted, 196 F.2d 680 (2d Cir. 1952); Southern Saddlery Co.,
90 N.L.R.B. 1205 (1950). See also Brubaker, in What Kind of Information Do Labor
Unions Want in Financial Statements?, 87 J. ACCOUNTANCY 368 (1949); Shair, A
Look at the Books, 6 LAB. L.J. 53 (1955); Sherman, supra note 1.
3. Taylor Forge & Pipe Works v. NLRB, 234 F.2d 227 (7th Cir. 1956), enforcing
113 N.L.R.B. 693 (1955); Crompton-Highland Mills, Inc., 70 N.L.R.B. 206 1946),
enforcement denied on other grounds, 167 F.2d 662 (5th Cir. 1948), rev'd, 33 U.S.
217 (1949) ; see NLRB v. Otis Elevator Co., 208 F.2d 176 (2d Cir.), enforcing 102
N.L.R.B. 770 (1953).
4. E.g., Leland-Gifford Co., 95 N.L.R.B. 1306 (1951), enforcement granted on
order to furnish information but rev'd on other grounds, 200 F.2d 620 (1st Cir. 1952) ;
Electric Auto-Lite Co., 89 N.L.R.B. 1192 (1950); B. F. Goodrich Co., 89 N.L.R.B.
1151 (1950); see Whitin Mach. Works, 108 N.L.R.B. 1537, enforcement granted, 217
F.2d 593 (4th Cir. 1954).
5. E.g., Hearst Corp., 102 N.L.R.B. 637 (1953) ; Leland-Gifford Corp., supra note
4; B. F. Goodrich Co., supra note 4.
6. See Kirkland, in What Kind of Information Do Labor Unions Want in Finan-
cial Statements?, 87 J. AccoUNTAN Y 368, 370 (1949).
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disclosure on demand may best be considered against the background of
the bargaining concept's development.
Management's assertion that a duty to comply with these requests
would violate managerial prerogatives is initially predicated upon a narrow
and now outdated interpretation of the National Labor Relations Act 7 as
reflecting no congressional intent to impose an obligation to bargain at all.
Legislative history indicates that Congress' primary purpose in passing
the act was to remove impediments to the organization of unions,8 and
there is nothing in the act's history, or in that of the Taft-Hartley Act,9
from which it might be inferred that Congress also intended to grant the
Board power to regulate the collective bargaining process or do anything
more than lead the union to management's "office door." 10 Consistent
with this intent, the employer unfair labor practices delimited in both labor
acts relate to conduct which would hinder union organization. Only section
8(a) (5)," imposing on employers the duty to bargain collectively, refers
specifically to the bargaining process and even this obligation is said to
have been designed to prevent employers from undermining union organ-
izational efforts,12 requiring that such bargaining as the employer chooses
shall be with the union rather than directly with individual employees.
Nevertheless, the statutory language does not require so limited an inter-
pretation. While it is possible to construe the statute's enunciated policy
of avoiding "industrial strife" 13 as referring only to disputes arising from
efforts to organize, it is not expressly confined thereto. Furthermore,
section 8(a) (5), when considered with the specification in 8(d) of subjects
about which management is to confer in "good faith" 14 and concerning
which 9(a) requires recognition of the union as the employees' representa-
tive,15 may be construed as imposing on the employer an affirmative duty
to bargain. Accordingly, notwithstanding management's argument based
on legislative history, the NLRB and the courts have interpreted the
statutory language broadly to require compulsory bargaining on terms and
conditions of employment."6
7. 49 STAT. 449 (1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-66 (1946).
8. See statement of Senator Walsh in 79 CoNG. Rvc. 7660 (1935).
9. 61 STAT. 136 (1947), as amended, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-68 (1952); cf. note 120
infra.
10. See Cox & Dunlop, Regulation of Collective Bargaining by the National Labor
Relations Board, 63 HAv. L. R.v. 389, 395 (1950).
11. 61 STAT. 140 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1952).
12. Hearings Before Senate Committee on Education and Labor on S. 195, 74th
Cong., 1st Sess. 79 (1935).
13. 61 STAT. 136 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 141 (1952).
14. 61 STAT. 140 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1952).
15. 61 STAT. 143 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1952).
16. Management is at present required to bargain on such subjects as holiday and
vacation pay, Singer Mfg. Co., 24 N.L.R.B. 444 (1940), modified and enforcement
granted, 119 F.2d 131 (7th Cir. 1941), pensions, Inland Steel Co., 77 N.L.R.B. 1,
enforcement granted, 170 F.2d 247 (7th Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 336 U.S. 960 (1949),
bonuses, Union Mfg. Co., 76 N.L.R.B. 322 (1948), profit sharing, ibid., insurance bene-
fits, W. W. Cross & Co., 77 N.L.R.B. 1162 (1948), enforcement granted, 174 F.2d 875
(1st Cir. 1949), subcontracting, Timken Roller Bearing Co., 70 N.L.R.B. 500 (1946),
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Compulsory bargaining having been established, management main-
tained that discussion alone constituted "bargaining" and employers may
insist on a unilateral power of decision on bargainable items without violat-
ing the act. The Board, in order to insure an element of give-and-take in
the bargaining process, held that "good faith" is inherent in bargaining 17
and, therefore, management's insistence on unilateral decision on bargain-
able subjects fails to meet the statutory requirement of "bargaining" unless
such a management position is consistent with good faith.'8 While the
Board at first purported to examine each such case to determine whether
management in fact acted in good faith,19 the view soon crystallized that
insistence on unilateral decision of bargainable issues is a violation per se of
the good faith standard.20 The implications for the instant problem of the
Board's recognition of a per se violation will be considered later herein.
2 1
The bargaining concept having thus evolved into an affirmative duty
involving joint decision, labor further contends that good faith bargaining
requires the employer upon request to furnish the union any information
which the union might need for proper performance of the bargaining
function. Two theories have been advanced to support this position.
One widely accepted view emphasizes the "good faith" aspect of an
employer's statutory duty to bargain collectively. The "good faith" re-
quirement, it is urged, represents an attempt by Congress to legislate a
state of mind 2 2 so that both sides will "enter into discussions with an open
and fair mind and a sincere purpose to find a basis for agreement. . .. ," 2
The existence of "good faith" is a question of fact to be determined by the
NLRB, and an employer's refusal to comply with a union request for in-
formation may be considered evidence of an unwillingness to bargain in
"good faith." Under this subjective approach, the unfair labor practice
would be the employer's improper mental attitude as inferred from his
refusal to furnish the information-not the refusal itself. Analytically,
therefore, the good faith requirement does not create an independent obliga-
tion of disclosure, since only a particular state of mind is prescribed. Hence,
enforcement denied on other grounds, 161 F.2d 949 (6th Cir. 1947), shop rules, ibid.,
work schedules, Inter-City Advertising Co., 61 N.L.R.B. 1377, 1384 (1945), enforce-
ment denied on other grounds, 154 F.2d 244 (4th Cir. 1946), rest periods, National
Grinding Wheel Co., 75 N.L.R.B. 905 (1948), merit increases, NLRB v. J. H. Allison
& Co., 165 F.2d 766 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 335 U.S. 814 (1948), enforcing 70
N.L.R.B. 377 (1946), retirement programs, Allied Mills, Inc., 82 N.L.R.B. 854 (1949)
and union security, NLRB v. Andrew Jergens Co., 175 F.2d 130 (9th Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 338 U.S. 827 (1949), enforcing 76 N.L.R.B. 363 (1948).
17. This interpretation has been expressly incorporated into the Taft-Hartley
Act's definition of collective bargaining. 61 STAT. 140 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158(d)
(1952); cf. note 120 infra.
18. See Aluminum Ore Co., 39 N.L.R.B. 1286, modified and enforcement granted,
131 F.2d 485 (7th Cir. 1942).
19. E.g., ibid.
20. See, e.g., J. H. Allison & Co., 70 N.L.R.B. 377 (1946), enforcement granted,
165 F.2d 766 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 335 U.S. 814 (1948).
21. See p. 102 infra.
22. Card, supra note 1.
23. Singer Mfg. Co., 24 N.L.R.B. 444, 464 (1940).
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the usual cease and desist remedy would not directly compel disclosure,
although as a practical matter in many situations the employer would be
forced to furnish some information if he is to fulfill the obligation of bar-
gaining in "good faith." 24
A second theory advanced is that the union needs information to
perform properly its statutory function as exclusive representative of the
employees, and the employer should be required to furnish such information
in compliance with his duty to bargain.25 It may be argued in support of
this view that full disclosure of relevant information facilitates more rational
and intelligent bargaining by both sides, thereby creating a greater prob-
ability of peaceable accommodation of differences. This approach would
determine the employer's obligation to furnish information by the objec-
tive relevance of the requested data to the bargaining process. If the in-
formation is deemed relevant, then the union's need for it must be balanced
against the possible harm that may result to the employer from its dis-
closure. In any event, the requirement of disclosure would not depend on
the employer's mental attitude.
These two approaches seem to represent conflicting views as to how
the collective bargaining process should operate. If all that is necessary
is for management and labor to sit down together and discuss their differ-
ences with a mutual desire to reach agreement, then the subjective require-
ment of "good faith" provides a sufficient standard for the obligation to
furnish information. 26 By this approach, refusal to furnish requested in-
formation would be an unfair labor practice only where it indicated that
the employer lacked an "open and fair mind." On the other hand, collective
bargaining can be considered not as an end in itself but rather as a means of
accomplishing the broader statutory purpose of avoiding strikes and other
forms of industrial strife, imposing such reasonable requirements as may
contribute to management-labor rapprochement.27 Under this interpreta-
tion, an objective ascertainment of the information needed to create condi-
tions conductive to agreement would be the appropriate method for deter-
mining what data the employer must make available to the union.
The Board has utilized both approaches in cases which have come
before it.2 8 Moreover, both have formed the basis for orders requiring
the disclosure of information2 9 Regardless of the theory advanced, how-
24. See Aluminum Ore Co., 39 N.L.R.B. 1286, modified and enforcement granted,
131 F.2d 485 (7th Cir. 1942), where the lack of the requested information made it
impossible for the union to understand the employer's wage structure, thus effectively
preventing the union from bargaining on wages.
25. See Whitin Mach. Works, 108 N.L.R.B. 1537, enforcement granted, 217 F.2d
593 (4th Cir. 1954).
26. Cf. Cox & Dunlop, supra note 10.
27. Cf. NLRB v. Truitt Mfg. Co., 351 U.S. 149, 152 (1956).
28. See, e.g., Whitin Mach. Works, 108 N.L.R.B. 1537, enforcement granted, 217
F.2d 593 (4th Cir. 1954) (objective approach) and Southern Saddlery Co., 90 N.L.R.B.
1205 (1950) (subjective approach).
29. Compare New Britain Mach. Co., 105 N.L.R.B. 646 (1953), enforcement
granted, 210 F.2d 61 (2d Cir. 1954) (objective approach), with Jacobs Mfg. Co., 94
N.L.R.B. 1214 (1951), enforcement granted, 196 F.2d 680 (2d Cir. 1952) (subjective
approach).
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ever, employers have objected to orders requiring disclosure as an invasion
of their "managerial prerogatives." 3 0 This claim of "managerial pre-
rogative" premises that ownership of a business carries with it certain
rights which may not be restricted, and that among these is the right to
withhold information about that business. 3 ' Based as it is on an assertion
of the rights of private property, this argument has strong emotional appeal
to many. Nevertheless, management's claim that it need not furnish
information merely because it so prefers cannot be persuasive where dis-
closure may be essential to accomplish a statutory objective.
Since the issues must vary somewhat with the data requested, an
employer's duty to furnish requested information will be examined herein
according to the three major types of information involved: that concern-
ing the employees, the employer's financial status and management research
studies. Thereafter, some consideration will be given to questions arising
when it is claimed that the union has waived its right to obtain informa-
tion or that the subsequent conclusion of a contract has eliminated any
obligation of disclosure.
INFORMATION RELATING TO EMPLOYEES
Much of the data sought by unions pertains to pay rates,32 hours
worked,-" job classification 3 4 and seniority status 3 5 of the employees in the
bargaining unit. Although most of this information could be supplied by
the employees, it is more convenient, cheaper and less time-consuming for
the union to obtain it directly from the employer.3 6 In addition, where the
bargaining unit is large, it may be impractical for the union to poll all the
employees t  Moreover, by having the employer furnish the information,
errors arising in its compilation as well as those resulting from the tendency
of employees to exaggerate their positions are eliminated.3 8  Finally, this
30. Sherman, supra note 1.
31. Cf. Lipstreu, Management Rights: Conflict or Cooperation?, 7 LAi. L.J. 555
(1956).
32. See, e.g., NLRB v. Whitin Mach. Works, 217 F.2d 593 (4th Cir.), enforcing
108 N.L.R.B. 1537 (1954); .NLRB v. Yawman & Erbe Mfg. Co., 187 F.2d 947 (2d
Cir. 1951), enforcing 89 N.L.R.B. 881 (1950); Aluminum Ore Co. v. NLRB, 131 F.2d
485 (7th Cir.), modifying and enforcing 39 N.L.R.B. 1286 (1942).
33. See F. W. Woolworth Co., 109 N.L.R.B. 196 (1954), enforcement denied, 235
F.2d 319 (9th Cir. 1956).
34. See cases cited in note 32 supra.
35. See NLRB v. Whitin Mach. Works, 217 F.2d 593 (4th Cir.), enforcing 108
N.L.R.B. 1537 (1954).
36. If furnishing the information necessitates any unreasonable expenditures, it
would seem reasonable to require the union to reimburse the employer. See Whitin
Mach. Works, 108 N.L.R.B. 1537, 1541 (1954) (concurring opinion); cf. text at note
91 infra.
37. Cf. Aluminum Ore Co., 39 N.L.R.B. 1286, modified and enforcement granted,
131 F.2d 485 (7th Cir. 1942) (request for information concerning employees no
longer working for the company).
38. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 113 N.L.R.B. 954, 977 (1955); Electric Auto-Lite
Co., 89 N.L.R.B. 1192, 1199 (1950).
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procedure avoids possible friction between the union 39 and any non-union
members of the bargaining unit represented by the union.
Management has been unenthusiastic about supplying this informa-
tion. Not only does management gain no direct advantage from relieving
the union of the burden of gathering such data for itself, but employers
generally are not anxious to assist in improving union bargaining ability.
However, the extent of this resistance no doubt varies with the amount of
effort the employer must expend iri furnishing the data, the benefit that
might accrue indirectly through cordial relations with the union and the
willingness of the particular employer to accept the increased power and
prestige of the union.
The first case in which an employer's failure to furnish wage informa-
tion was held a refusal to bargain in good faith was Aluminum Ore Co.40
Prior to 1941 it had been the practice of the company, with union ac-
quiescence, to set wages unilaterally.41 In 1941, when the union sought
to obtain a wage increase for all employees, the company took the position
that negotiation of wages on an over-all basis was against its policy and
it would discuss wages only on an individual basis. The company then
refused to supply the union with job classification data, rendering the union
unable to understand the company's wage structure, and, in an attempt
to escape negotiation on a general basis, unilaterally granted most em-
ployees a wage increase. The Board held that the company had refused
to bargain collectively, and issued a cease and desist order. However, the
company was not ordered to furnish the requested information, which in-
dicates that the Board viewed the failure to supply the information not as
itself constituting bad faith but only as evidence thereof.
Subsequent decisions also treated an employer's refusal to furnish
data as merely evidence of bad faith, but in each such case there was
always other employer conduct to corroborate a bad-faith finding.4 Finally,
in Yawnwzn & Erbe Mfg. Co.,4 the impracticability of the "evidence" ap-
proach was exposed: with other evidence lacking, the only conduct alleged
to establish bad faith was the company's refusal to furnish wage data.
The dispute in Yawman & Erbe arose when, in response to the union's
demand for an increased minimum wage, the company offered to renew the
existing contract. At this point the union requested a list of the employees
and their wage rates under the current contract and those of the two
prior years. The employer, contending that this information was not
39. See F. W. Woolworth Co., 109 N.L.R.B. 196, 205 (1954).
40. 39 N.L.R.B. 1286, nodified and enforcement granted, 131 F.2d 485 (7th Cir.
1942).
41. Id. at 1290.
42. See Vanette Hosiery Mills, 80 N.L.R.B. 1116 (1948); National Grinding
Wheel, 75 N.L.R.B. 905 (1948); J. H. Allison & Co., 70 N.L.R.B. 377 (1946),
enforcement granted, 165 F.2d 766 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 335 U.S. 814 (1948);
Sherwin-Williams Co., 34 N.L.R.B. 651 (1941), .enforcement granted, 130 F.2d 255
(3d Cir. 1942).
43. 89 N.L.R.B. 881 (1950).
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necessary to bargain on minimum wages, refused to comply. The NLRB
found the current data relevant to the negotiations because of management's
offer to renew the existing contract and because the going rate, in any
event, is a factor to be considered by a union when deciding to press
for a wage increase. Failure to furnish wage data under the existing con-
tract was deemed an unfair labor practice, and the employer was ordered
to supply it. The order did not extend to the earlier data, however, for the
Board held this had not been shown relevant. Board member Murdock
dissented as to the information for prior years, asserting that no specific
finding of relevancy should be required since "this is one of those areas
where the specific need for information may not be apparent until it has
been made available." 44 In enforcing the Board's order, the Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit said that an employer has ". . an affirm-
ative statutory duty to supply relevant wage data . . ." and that ".
the information must be disclosed unless it plainly appears irrelevant." 45
The Issue of Relevance
Yawnnan & Erbe marked a change in the NLRB's approach to the
wage information problem. Significantly lacking in that decision was an
attempt to evaluate the employer's "good faith" mental attitude; instead
the Board focused on the information's relevance to collective bargaining.
The developing relevance approach was climaxed in Whitin Mach.
Works.40 There the employer had given employees' names, job classi-
fications, seniority status and wage rates to the union, but refused to link
the wage rates to individuals, contending such specificity was unnecessary
because the union sought only a general wage increase. In citing this
refusal as an unfair labor practice, the NLRB based the union's right to
such knowledge on its status as exclusive employee representative under
section 9(a). Since wage data is at the core of bargaining and adminis-
tration of employment contracts, the Board viewed its denial as tending to
undermine the union's standing, and the employer was placed under an
affirmative duty to supply such data without a demonstration of its specific
relevance.
Whitin's "presumption" of relevance, while inferentially supported by
the majority, was articulated only in Chairman Farmer's concurring opinion
where he indicated that, in future cases of this kind, he would consider
employers obligated to furnish such data as is generally material to the
entire collective bargaining process, without examining its relevance to
the particular bargaining issues, unless the employer establishes that the
request was made for purposes of harassment and, hence, not in good
faith.4T This broad rule was regarded necessary to arrest the bickering and
44. Id. at 885.
45. NLRB v. Yawman & Erbe Mfg. Co., 187 F.2d 947, 949 (2d Cir. 1951).
46. 108 N.L.R.B. 1537, enforcement granted, 217 F.2d 593 (4th Cir. 1954).
47. Id. at 1541.
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jockeying that had characterized employer reaction to union demands for
such information.
Shortly thereafter, in Boston Herald-Traveler Corp.,48 this view was
adopted by the entire Board and expressly affirmed by the First Circuit
in enforcing the Board's order.49 The court found the rule desirable
because of the virtual impossibility of predicting the course of negotiations
and, therefore, the need for given data. Since disclosure might reveal
wage inequities which might then become the subject of bargaining, only
where the information is patently outside bargaining areas can it realistically
be considered irrelevant.
Judicial approval of this theory has not been unanimous, however.
Recently the Ninth Circuit, in NLRB v. F. W. Woolworth Co., 0 refused
to enforce a Board order to furnish wage data. The court, although recog-
nizing that in some circumstances an employer has a statutory duty to
provide wage information, opined that such information is "highly con-
fidential" to the employee and, therefore, should be disclosed only when
the union demonstrates a specific need for it. The problem was conceived
as one of balancing the employee's right of privacy against the union's
need for the information. The advisability of allowing an employer to
raise employees' privacy as a defense, though, is questionable.51
On the whole, the presumptive relevancy approach seems a rational
solution. For wage bargaining the union must have a list of all employees
in the unit together with their seniority status, job classifications and pay
rates in order to decide intelligently whether to negotiate on minimum wage
rates, across-the-board increases, merit increases or alternative plans. In
addition, this data is necessary if the union is to detect discriminatory
practices. 2  Without such facts the union would be unable to fulfill its
statutory responsibility of representing all employees in the bargaining
unit. Furthermore, as pointed out in the Herald-Traveler case, a specific
demonstration of relevancy may be impossible because of the difficulty of
foretelling what information will be needed for the bargaining; if the in-
formation is to be of any use to the union, it must be available sufficiently
in advance of negotiations for the union to study it. At the same time,
furnishing this information will seldom, if ever, hurt the employer.
Primarily it is a question of the employer providing the information or the
union undertaking a burdensome and often unfeasible survey of the em-
ployees. Finally, this broad rule has the advantage of reasonable definite-
ness and thus will tend to eliminate much of the quibbling as to which in-
formation should be supplied.
48. 110 N.L.R.B. 2097 (1954).
49. Boston Herald-Traveler Corp. v. NLRB, 223 F.2d 58 (1st Cir. 1955).
50. 235 F.2d 319 (9th Cir. 1956), denying enforcement to 109 N.L.R.B. 196 (1954).
51. See pp. 98-99 infra.
52. See Boston Herald-Traveler Corp., 110 N.L.R.B. 2097 (1954), enforceient
granted, 223 F.2d 58 (lst Cir. 1955).
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The Defense of Confidentiality
Employers have in several cases contended they should not be com-
pelled to furnish wage data because it is confidential to themselves or their
employees. Of this defense in Aluminum Ore Co. v. NLRB 53 the court
observed:
"We can conceive of no justification for a claim that such informa-
tion is confidential. Rather it seems to go to the very root of the
facts upon which the merits were to be resolved. . .. And if there be
any reasonable basis for the contention that this may have been con-
fidential data of the employer before the passage of the Act, it seems
to us it can not be so held in the face of the expressed social and
economic purposes of the statute." 1'
It therefore seems clear that an employer's claim that these records are
confidential will be rejected, at least without some demonstration that dis-
closure will result in injury to a legitimate business interest. In only two
cases has such an injury been asserted, and in both the argument was
rejected. In Post Publishing Co.55 the employer's claim that disclosure of
wage data would create jealousy among employees and have a harmful
effect on their morale was dismissed as "too speculative." 56 Later, in
Boston Herald-Traveler Corp., the employer contended that such dis-
closure would lead to the pirating of some of his employees by competing
newspapers. The Board found this danger outweighed by the value of
informed bargaining.
These cases may not preclude an employer's defense of injury to his
business from disclosure, but there seem few conceivable situations where
disclosure would be sufficiently detrimental to necessitate withholding the
data from the union. This type of information is not wholly secret; the
employees, if they wished, could reveal it themselves.
A more difficult question arises where the employer claims that dis-
closure would be an invasion of his employees' privacy. Undoubtedly
many employees would not want their salaries disclosed, and some courts
and members of the Board have been sensitive to this desire for privacy.
Two recent circuit court decisions are illustrative of the conflicting views
on this question. In Utica Observer-Dispatch v. NLRB 5 the company
informed each employee that it would furnish wage data to the union unless
the employee objected. In holding that the information must be supplied
notwithstanding employee objection, the Second Circuit upheld the Board's
theory that disclosure is not contingent on employee consent since the union
53. 131 F.2d 485 (7th Cir.), vnodifying and enforcing 39 N.L.R.B. 1286 (1942).
54. Id. at 487.
55. 102 N.L.R.B. 648 (1953).
56. It should be noted that any unfair wage differentials such as would create
employee jealousy are of legitimate -concern to the union.
57. 229 F.2d 575 (2d Cir. 1956), enforcing 111 N.L.R.B. 58 (1955).
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has a statutory right to this information arising from its duty to represent
the employees. 8 On the other hand, in denying enforcement of a Board
order to furnish wage data, the Ninth Circuit in NLRB v. F. W. Wool-
worth Co. said that there were "a number of cogent arguments that the
employee should have a right of privacy on payroll information" 5 9 and
that, before it would enforce disclosure of information "highly personal to
employees,"0 80 there must be some demonstration of the data's specific
relevance to the negotiations.
While the Woolworth Company's concern for the privacy of its em-
ployees may be praiseworthy, there is something incongruous about an
employer protecting his employees from their own union. Perhaps the
better solution is that suggested in NLRB v. Item Co.,"' where the court
concluded it would be unwise to let employers rely on employee rights
because such defenses would disturb orderly bargaining procedure and tend
to undermine union authority. 2
DIsCLOSURE OF FINANCIAL INFORMATION
For several years labor leaders have expressed their interest in in-
formation on the employer's financial status.P Such information enables
a union to evaluate the effect on the employer of proposed wage increases 64
and other employee benefits. Moreover, where the employer's ability to
pay a wage increase is injected into the negotiations, the union is unable
to discuss the matter intelligently without access to the information on
which the employer relies.0 5 At the same time, such information enables
the union to assess the employer's financial strength and to determine his
ability to withstand a strike, thereby improving the union's strategic posi-
tion in the negotiations.
Management generally has been unwilling to make available data
concerning its financial position. Much of this resistance can be attributed
to a feeling that such information is private. 6 Employers have also voiced
the fear that a consequence of such divulgence will be dispute over pricing
and accounting policies-matters which they consider within the realm of
58. Moreover, the court affirmed the Board's holding that, in informing the em-
ployees of the union's request and giving them the opportunity to object to it, the
company had committed an unfair labor practice because such direct dealing with the
employees tended to cripple the union's prestige.
59. 235 F2d at 321.
60. Id. at 323.
61. 220 F.2d 956 (5th Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 25 U.S.L. WEEK 3153 (U.S. Nov.
19, 1956) (No. 450), enforcing 108 N.L.R.B. 1634 (1954) ; see also Utica Observer-
Dispatch v. NLRB, 229 F.2d 575 (2d Cir. 1956), enforcing 111 N.L.R.B. 58 (1955).
62. The court quoted justice Frankfurter in Brooks v. NLRB, 348 U.S. 96, 103
(1954) : "The underlying purpose of the statute is industrial peace. To allow employ-
ers to rely on employees' rights in refusing to bargain with the formally designated
union is not conducive to that end, it is inimical to it."
63. See Sherman, vupra note 1. For the type of data requested, see id. at 26-27.
64. See Kirkland, supra note 6.
65. See Southern Saddlery Co., 90 N.L.R.B. 1205 (1950).
66. See Daykin, Furnishing Wage Data for Bargaining, 4 LAB. L.J. 417 (1953).
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managerial prerogative. 67 Finally, it is contended that disclosure of such
data could aid competitors to the disadvantage of the disclosing company.68
The leading NLRB decision on the employer's duty to impart financial
information is Southern Saddlery Co. 0 9 where the company refused to
grant a wage increase on the ground that it was financially unable to do
so. When the union requested information substantiating the claim of
financial inability, the company declined, asserting that divulgence of such
information to anyone was contrary to its policy. The Board rejected this
argument, declaring:
"The Respondent, by maintaining the intransigent position that it was
financially unable to raise wages and, at the same time, by refusing
to make any reasonable efforts to support or justify its position, erected
an insurmountable barrier to successful conclusion of the bargaining.
We believe that such conduct does not meet the test of good faith
bargaining." 70
Although the Board ordered Southern Saddlery to bargain in good
faith, without specifically requiring production of any information, as a
practical matter the company was forced to substantiate its claim. In a
similar case the following year, the employer was specifically ordered to
furnish "such statistical and other information as will substantiate the Re-
spondent's position in bargaining... ,, 7' The Board has never held,
however, that an employer must allow the union to examine his books. His
obligation is said to be that of explaining the reasons for his position and
supplying enough information to enable the union to bargain intelligently
on the issues involved.
72
Recently, the Supreme Court in NLRB v. Truitt Mfg. Co.73 unani-
mously agreed that refusal to substantiate a claim of inability to pay in-
creased wages was evidence that the employer was bargaining in bad faith.
Moreover, a majority of the Court 7 4 felt that this evidence alone was
sufficient to support a finding of bad faith. The Court, however, expressly
limited its holding to the facts of the case. Three dissenting Justices 75
maintained that proper application of the good faith standard requires
consideration of the totality of the employer's conduct, and urged the case's
remand to the Board for receipt of other evidence as to the employer's
attitude.
67. See Sherman, supra note 1, at 34.
68. Id. at 35; see also Daykin supra note 66.
69. 90 N.L.R.B. 1205 (1950).
70. Id. at 1207.
71. Jacobs Mfg. Co., 94 N.L.R.B. 1214, 1226 (1951), enforcement granted, 196
F.2d 680 (2d Cir. 1952).
72. McLean-Arkansas Lumber Co., 109 N.L.R.B. 1022, 1023, 1037 (1954).
73. 351 U.S. 149 (1956); ef. NLRB v. I.B.S. Mfg. Co., 210 F.2d 634 (5th
Cir. 1954), denying enforcement to 96 N.L.R.B. 1263 (1951).
74. Chief Justice Warren, justices Black, Reed, Douglas, Burton and Minton.
75. Justices Frankfurter, Clark and Harlan.
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Although the Court purported to follow the subjective "good faith"
approach, its approval of the NLRB's bad-faith finding merely from the
failure to furnish information seems inconsistent therewith. The tacit
inference that an unsubstantiated claim is a dishonest claim is certainly
permissible, but the employer's refusal to furnish financial information may.
as rationally be attributed to other, less reprehensible motivations such
as a justifiable belief that the data will fall into the hands of competitors
who will use it to his detriment 76 or simply that there was no obligation to
produce the data.77 If the subjective approach is to be retained the Truitt
dissenters' view logically follows, for an employer's refusal to disclose is
only one factor which should be weighed together with his other conduct
in order to determine his willingness to cooperate with the union. Only
where the requested data is needed by the union for a valid purpose would
his refusal even tend to indicate bad faith. However, by this view should
the employer's other conduct indicate a cooperative attitude he may well
not be adjudged to have refused to bargain, in which case the union would
still lack data essential to effective bargaining. At the same time, if the
employer's general conduct indicates an unwillingness to bargain, although
the refusal by itself is based on protection of a legitimate business interest,
the inquiry into this defense would be prejudiced and confused by the
evidentiary impact of his other conduct. The subjective approach therefore
seems inadequate. It permits results which, on the one hand, may frustrate
the objectives of collective bargaining and, on the other hand, may impede
consideration of the genuine interests involved. It appears more realistic
and constructive to make the inquiry on an objective basis with the dis-
positive order requiring or denying access to the requested information.
If there is authentic need for the data, failure to produce it should constitute
bad faith except when divulgence will result in damage to the employer
disproportionate to the information's value to the union.
Whenever information dealing with the employer's financial condi-
tion is relevant to an issue about which the parties are bargaining, its need
to the union is obvious. Such data becomes relevant when management
and the union stipulate that the employer's ability to pay is a proper factor
to be considered in bargaining on a given issue as well as when the employer
has pleaded economic inability and the union has agreed to consider this.
Although knowledge of the employer's position may aid the union in
planning its bargaining tactics, there appears to be no authority for recog-
nizing this use as one related to bargaining, since the bargaining process,
even to the extent that it is regulated, has not been wholly removed from
arm's length dealing. Therefore, since information relating to the merits
of the employer's financial condition will not logically tend to move the
76. In Truitt there was no contention that disclosure would be injurious to the
company's business. It was perhaps the implications of such a contention in a future
case that led the Court to limit the Truitt holding to its facts, 351 U.S. at 153-54,
although the Court gave no indication of what facts might give rise to a different
decision.
77. See Truitt Mfg. Co., 110 N.L.R.B. 856, 861 (1954).
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parties closer to final agreement until the parties stipulate that the data
should be considered in arriving at a settlement, it is submitted that only
then should the data be deemed relevant. Once need has been demon-
strated, the only factor militating against disclosure is the possibility that
the employer may be injured thereby.
On the issue of injury the usual claim is that competitors and the union
may use the disclosed data to management's detriment. It is doubtful
whether much of the disclosed material could be of any real aid to com-
petitors.78 However, to provide against such contingency management
could condition divulgence on the union's agreement to indemnify the em-
ployer for injury resulting from any violation of the confidential relationshi*j
from which need for the data arose.79 Fear of the union's use of the in-
formation for strategic purposes-i.e., determining the company's ability
to withstand a strike-may have some basis, but it is not a practical problem
since such calculations usually are not accurate or even possible.80 It
should be of concern only to employers who are unable to afford the pro-
posed increase and also have an obviously weak financial position, and for
them it is probably worth risking the injury in order to demonstrate to the
union the company's inability to pay the increase. Where the employer
is financially strong, although the union may find this fact helpful in
planning its bargaining tactics the disclosure may redound to the employer's
benefit by persuading the union that it would be foolhardy to strike. There-
fore, it is submitted that since the possible injury from disclosure will not
outweigh the value of the data to the union where such is relevant, a refusal
to furnish it despite union indemnification for a breach of confidence should
be a per se violation. The Truitt majority approximates this view, dis-
claimers notwithstanding, and adequate precedent for a per se doctrine
may be found in the cases on an employer's reservation of unilateral power
of decisions' and in the presumptive relevance of wage data.U
Positing a requirement to disclose where the employer's ability to pay
is an issue, when should the information be made available? At present
the union is not entitled to the information until the employer claims eco-
78. Information concerning the general financial status of many companies is
already available to the public in the form of published financial statements. In addi-
tion, information about companies that do not publicly disclose their financial standing
can be obtained through Dun & Bradstreet reports. Of course there may be some
bargaining situations in which it will be necessary for the employer to disclose detaild
cost information which would not otherwise be available to the public. However, this
will not be the typical situation. See Sherman, supra note 1, at 35.
79. Although the effectiveness of this remedy may be limited by the difficulties
involved in establishing the violation and the extent of damage resulting to the em-
ployer, it would still seem preferable to the alternative of permitting the lack of nec-
essary information to block a successful conclusion of the negotiations.
80. Financial strength is only one of the factors determining how long an em-
ployer will resist union demands. Another factor is the extent to which financial aid
will be forthcoming from other sources, such as suppliers or customers, to support
the fight against the union. In addition, an important consideration will be the
extent to which the employer believes he can pass the wage increase along to his
customers in the form of higher prices.
81. See p. 92 supra and cases cited in note 16 supra.
82. See pp. 96-97 supra.
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nomic inability.8 Ordinarily this occurs in the midst of negotiations so
that even if the data is supplied there is little time for the union representa-
tives to study it. It would thus seem desirable that the data be forthcoming
prior to negotiations. However, the material will never be needed unless
the employer's ability to pay becomes an issue in the negotiations. In
view of the potential harm to the employer it appears improper to require
disclosure on the mere possibility that the information may be needed.
One solution would be for the union to request the material in advance
of the principal bargaining sessions. The employer could then either comply
with the union request or declare that his ability to pay is not relevant. In
the latter instance the union may still consider the employer's ability to
pay relevant in determining the wage scale, but the employer's financial
status will not itself become an issue in negotiations if management has
agreed not to challenge labor's proposal on this basis. In the event that
the employer later unexpectedly injects a claim of economic inability it
would seem proper to cite his earlier refusal as an unfair labor practice.
MANAGEMENT RESEARCH DATA
Management's wage policies are often founded on information sup-
plied by time studies and other research techniques.8 4 Data so produced
may underlie a company's determination of its bargaining offer as well as
the maximum it is willing to pay in order to avert a strike. This informa-
tion also may be used in setting prices, scheduling plant activity and
realizing production efficiencies, and would therefore be extremely harmful
in the hands of competitors. Potential harm from this source and the pos-
sibility that union leaders will contest the data's accuracy or reliability
-subjects which management considers within its own province-make
employers reluctant to reveal such studies to the union.
Time Studies
Union requests for a copy of management's time study, or for permis-
sion to make its own, typically occur when the parties are considering link-
ing wages to the worker's productivity as measured by time. A charac-
teristic incentive system involves assignment of a point rating for each job
operation. Theoretically a point is the equivalent of one minute's work.
However, the work to be assigned a point is calculated so that the average
employee can do more than sixty points of work an hour, and bonuses
are awarded for the excess hourly points. Under this type of plan, the
points per operation would be assigned either pursuant to agreement be-
tween the parties 8 or by management alone subject to review in a
83. See NLRB Ad. Rul., Case No. K-467, 38 L.R.R.M. 1076 (May 17, 1956);
NLRB General Counsel Rul., Case No. 951, 34 L.R.R.M. 1208 (1954).
84. For a brief discussion of the application of time studies to various systems
of wage payment, see MzmUic, TIMn STUDIZS AS A BASIS roR RATn SFiTTING. 333-54
(1920).
85. Crompton-Highland Mills, Inc., 70 N.L.R.B. 206 (1946), enforcement denied
on other grounds, 167 F.2d 662 (5th Cir. 1948), rev'd, 337 U.S. 217 (1949).
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grievance proceeding instituted by the union.86 In either case, if the
parties were to bargain merely on the basis of estimates, with no time study
having been made, there would seem no statutory basis for requiring the
employer to permit a union-sponsored time study just because the NLRB
may consider such a study a more accurate basis for negotiations. How-
ever, if the employer is bargaining with the knowledge of an existing time
study, not only is the time-study data made relevant to the issue of wage
setting but the union is then unable to negotiate intelligently without access
to similar information. In this situation, then, the conclusion seems justified
that a refusal to make such information available manifests bad faith, not-
withstanding an otherwise general willingness to cooperate. The union
could acquire the necessary information either by conducting its own time
study, if given permission to enter the plant, or by obtaining a copy of
management's study.
The first case testing a union's right to a copy of management's time
study was Crompton-Highland Mills, Inc.s 7 In the course of negotiating
wages under an incentive plan, the union requested a copy of the company's
time study. The company refused, but offered to let the union make its
own study. The NLRB held that, in view of this offer, the employer's
refusal did not show bad faith. One member dissented, contending that
the delay resulting if the union has to conduct its own study would be
such as to make this alternative unreasonable and, therefore, such an offer
did not excuse the company from supplying the data.
Subsequently, in Otis Elevator Co.,88 where the company rejected
union demands for an opportunity to conduct a union-sponsored time
study and for a copy of management's study as well, the Board held the
company to have refused to bargain and ordered it to comply with both
requests. However, the Second Circuit denied enforcement to that part
of the order requiring the employer to let the union make its own time
study,8 9 reasoning that the union could acquire sufficient information from
examining the employer's study and discussing it with the employees in-
volved. Judge Clark urged in dissent that if the union is to be allowed
some information it should not be stopped short of acquiring the most useful
data it could develop.
Although these cases were purportedly decided on the basis of whether
the employer's refusal indicated a lack of good faith in bargaining, their
import seems wider. In each case there was no other evidence of an un-
willingness to bargain; in fact, the employer was, at the time of his refusal,
negotiating with the union on the job standards involved. As a result,
these cases can be considered as establishing that whenever management
86. Otis Elevator Co., 102 N.L.RLB. 770, enforcement granted, 208 F.2d 176 (2d
Cir. 1953).
87. 70 N.L.R.B. 206 (1946), enforcement denied on other grounds, 167 F2d 662
(5th Cir. 1948), rev'd, 337 U.S. 217 (1949).
88. 102 N.L.R.B. 770 (1953).
89. NLRB v. Otis Elevator Co., 208 F.2d 176 (2d Cir. 1953).
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resorts to a time study in the course of bargaining the union is also entitled
to such data.
Even so, the employer apparently has a choice between revealing the
company study to the union or allowing the union itself to conduct a study.
From the union's standpoint, these alternatives will not always be equally
desirable. For instance, where the union doubts the accuracy of the em-
ployer's time study, it will prefer making its own.9 If a union study can
be completed without unreasonably interfering with plant operation there
would appear no reason for denying the union request. On the other hand,
where the nature or extent of operations makes a time study very costly,
the union may be satisfied with a copy of the employer's study. However,
in this situation it seems reasonable to condition the employer's obligation
to furnish his study on the union's willingness to share the cost.91
Job Evaluation
Another technique employed in setting wages is job analysis in terms
of a point rating for each of several designated factors according to their
relative significance in the particular job. For example, one such factor
is the task's "physical demand," for which a rating manual specifies point
allocations in five degrees varying from "light work requiring little physical
effort" to "continuous physical exertion working with heavy weight ma-
terial." 92 The total points given to all factors is the job rating on which
is based the wage rate assigned to the job.
Where such a system is employed, it is crucial in bargaining on wage
rates that the union know the job description and job rating for all em-
ployees in the unit. Moreover, in order to discuss each job rating intelli-
gently the union would need a copy of the rating manual which specifies the
points to be assigned for each degree of the designated factors. In addition,
some unions have requested for each job the individual point ratings ac-
cording to management's evaluation of each factor. The NLRB, in Taylor
Forge & Pipe Works,9 3 held that refusal to furnish the individual ratings
90. See Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 113 N.L.R.B. 954 (1955), 54 Micr. L. RZv.
865 (1956), where a majority of the NLRB indicated that all a union must show to
obtain access to the company's plant for a job evaluation is that the information sought
is relevant to an issue under discussion. Two members of the Board were of the opin-
ion that an employer need not allow a union access to his property unless the denial
of access "unreasonably impeded" the union in the exercise of its statutory rights.
Since one of the majority members considered the information sought irrelevant under
the particular facts there involved, the company was not required to grant access in
this case.
91. See Whitin Mach. Works, 108 N.L.R.B. 1537, 1541 (1954) (concurring opin-
ion).
92. See Taylor Forge & Pipe Works, 113 N.L.R.B. 693, 696 & n.9 (1955).
93. 113 N.L.R.B. 693 (1955). Chairman Farmer and Member Leedom dissented,
contending that the employer need not disclose his subjective judgment as to, e.g., the
degree of physical effort involved in a job. Rather, such matters are to be determined
at the bargaining conference. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the Board's decision,
one judge dissenting. The opinions followed substantially the same rationale as the
majority and dissenting opinions of the Board. Taylor Forge & Pipe Works v. NLRB,
234 F.2d 227 (7th Cir. 1956).
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is an unfair labor practice, analogizing the information to wage data which
is "presumptively relevant."
Although the individual evaluations are clearly relevant to the ques-
tion of wages, and knowledge thereof would facilitate union appraisal of
the company's offer, disclosure of such information could seriously handi-
cap the employer's bargaining position. By accepting for each job man-
agement's evaluations of those factors which the union would rate at the
same degree or lower, the union could place management in a position
where it would be bargaining only on the factors which the union con-
tends should be rated higher and not at all on those which the union might
concede should be lower. Although theoretically the employer need not
agree to his own prior evaluations, his bargaining position is extremely
weak if he seeks to downgrade his own evaluations during negotiations.
In addition, although job evaluations are done by an "expert," it is essen-
tially a subjective determination which is just as likely to result in excessive
points for some factors as in insufficient points for others, so that it may
be more appropriate for the parties to confine their bargaining to the totals,
disregarding individual factors. The union can and undoubtedly does make
its own evaluations; 94 as long as the union has enough information for
this purpose, it would seem sufficiently informed to bargain intelligently.
Therefore, it is submitted that in a case like Taylor Forge a better result
would be to deny the union access to management's individual evaluations.
This solution would avoid the inequity of diminishing management's bar-
gaining position where the union's need for the data could be satisfied
from another source. At the same time, if the parties prefer to bargain
on the basis of the individual factor evaluations, they can do so without
injury to either side by exchanging their own studies.
WAIVER OF RIGHT TO INFORMATION
A union is under no obligation to assert all its rights under the NLRA;
it may waive its right to strike,9 5 to bargain on a particular question 91
or to be present at the adjustment of grievances. 97 As long as the waiver
is voluntary it will be enforced.98 As a result, it has become a common
practice for employers to bargain for "management function" clauses em-
powering the company to act unilaterally in certain areas.99 Securing
such a waiver is one method by which an employer may protect himself
from having to disclose information which he considers confidential.
Because a union can bargain away its rights, however, does not mean
that in all cases an employer may insist upon the waiver as a condition
94. See id. at 229-30.
95. Shell Oil Co., 77 N.L.R.B. 1306 (1948).
96. Hughes Tool Co., 100 N.L.RB. 208 (1952) (the contract gave the company
exclusive responsibility for decisions concerning the right to subcontract or to have
work done by independent contractors).
97. Bethlehem Steel Co., 89 N.L.R.B. 341 (1950).
98. See Hughes Tool Co., 100 N.L.R.B. 208 (1952).
99. See Daykin, supra note 66.
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to signing a contract. For instance, although an employer may with im-
punity insist that the union waive its right to strike,1' ° his insistence that
the union waive its right to be present at the settlement of grievances has
been held a refusal to bargain in good faith. 10 1 Allowing an employer to
insist on waiver of the right to strike has been justified as serving the stat-
utory purpose of avoiding industrial strife.102 Nevertheless, the Board's
general approach seems aimed at limiting an employer's ability to control
the union by demanding a waiver of other rights.'0
Since the union needs information to bargain intelligently, the em-
ployer's duty to furnish it is in substance an integral part of his duty to
bargain. Therefore, management's insistence that the union waive its right
to information is tantamount to demanding power to decide unilaterally
the questions to which the information relates. Accordingly, in New
Britain Mach. Co. 104 the NLRB observed that adamant insistence on such
a waiver would constitute a refusal to bargain. Nevertheless, since the
union is the best judge of its bargaining needs, there is no reason to
expect that a voluntary waiver would not be enforced.
In several cases employers have defended their refusal to provide re-
quested information on the ground that the union had waived its right to
it. In no case, however, was there a waiver expressed in the contract.
The employer has generally asserted that union acquiescence in manage-
ment's rejection of a contractual provision requiring disclosure constituted
an implied waiver.105 At times, management has sought to bolster this
claim by invoking a contract clause stating that the writing constituted the
entire agreement between the parties.1 6 The NLRB has usually re-
jected this argument, requiring waiver of such a right to be "clear and
unequivocal." 107
Silence is probably an unreliable basis for inferring waiver because
a union ordinarily will be unwilling to waive its right to information. In
fact, the union's unwillingness to surrender this right may be the reason
for the absence of a specific provision on disclosure in the contract.1 8  But
in a recent case the Board adopted an expressio unius approach, holding
100. Shell Oil Co., 77 .N.L.R.B. 1306 (1948).
101. Bethlehem Steel Co., 89 N.L.R.B. 341 (1950).
102. Ibid.
103. See id. at 345.
104. 105 N.L.R.B. 646 (1953), enforcement granted, 210 F2d 61 (2d Cir. 1954).
105. F. W. Woolworth Co., 109 N.L.R.B. 196 (1954), enforcement denied, 235
F.2d 319 (9th Cir. 1956) ; Item Co., 108 N.L.R.B. 1634 (1954), enforcement granted,
220 F.2d 956 (5th Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 25 U.S.L. WE:x 3153 (U.S. Nov. 19, 1956)
(No. 450); New Britain Mach. Co., 105 N.L.R.B. 646 (1953), enforcement granted,
210 F.2d 61 (2d Cir. 1954).
106. California Portland Cement Co., 101 N.L.R.B. 1436 (1952); Leland-Gifford
Co., 95 N.L.R.B. 1306 (1951), enforcement granted on order to furnish information
but reed on other grounds, 200 F.2d 620 (1st Cir. 1952); cf. E. W. Scripps Co., 94
N.L.R.B. 227 (1951).
107. See cases cited in notes 105 and 106 supra.
108. In Hearst Corp., 36 L.R.R.M. 1454 (1955), a union representative testified
that the union had abandoned its original proposal for a provision in the contract
specifying the information that should be furnished because it believed that it was
entitled to the information anyway. Id. at 1455.
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that by contracting for the employer's divulgence of some information the
union had waived its right to any data not so specified., 9 It would seem
better not to recognize this type of implied waiver. Considering the
importance of intelligent bargaining as an aid to the rational settlement
of labor-management disputes, waiver should not be inferred from conduct
which is even slightly ambiguous.
EFFECT OF THE EXECUTION OF A CONTRACT
An employer's failure to furnish requested information may not, and
in fact usually does not, result in discontinuance of the negotiations." 0
Economic necessity may compel the parties to continue bargaining in an
effort to reach agreement. Sometimes, even after concluding an agree-
ment without the benefit of the requested data, unions have pressed the
employer's refusal as an unfair labor practice and sought disclosure of the
information."" Management's contention in such cases that the agree-
ment shows the information was not needed to bargain has been rejected
as based on hindsight and not indicative of the true relevance of the data,
since there is no way of knowing what the contract would have been had
the information been supplied." 2 "The most that can be inferred from
the Union's action is that the advantages of a contract in hand outweigh
those which the Union might later obtaiin when all relevant information
would be available to it." 11 For this reason it would appear appropriate
to disregard the later agreement in determining whether management's
refusal was an unfair labor practice." 4
An unfair labor practice once found, the employer may assert that
subsequent conclusion of the contract has relieved him of his obligation
to comply with the union request because the information is no longer rel-
evant.1  Accepting this view, the NLRB has not required management
to furnish any data where agreement has eliminated the need for it.n18 The
finding of an unfair labor practice, with the concomitant posting of notices,
is apparently considered sanction enough. However, there is a broad
exception to this rule where wage data is involved. Since such informa-
109. Hearst Corp., supra note 108.
110. The union could probably discontinue the negotiations pending a decision by
the Board on whether the information has to be furnished without being guilty of a
refusal to bargain, cf. Times Publishing Co., 72 N.L.R.B. 676, 682-83 (1947), but
ordinarily this would not be feasible in view of the delay that would be involved.
111. E.g., Boston Herald-Traveler Corp., 110 N.L.R.B. 2097 (1954), enforcement
granted, 223 F.2d 58 (1st Cir. 1955).
112. Ibid.
113. NLRB v. Yawman & Erbe Mfg. Co., 187 F.2d 947, 949 (2d Cir. 1951).
114. The Board's rule is that conclusion of a collective bargaining agreement
does not render moot the allegation of a refusal to bargain. Southern Saddlery Corp.,
90 NL.R.B. 1205, 1208 (1950); see Post Publishing Co., 102 N.L.R.B. 648 (1953);
Hearst Corp., 102 N.L.R.B. 637 (1953).
115. See F. W. Woolworth Co., 109 N.L.R.B. 196, 204 (1954), enforcement de-
nied, 235 F.2d 319 (9th Cir. 1956).
116. Ibid.; see Douglas Silk Products Co., 107 N.L.R.B. 450 (1953).
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tion is necessary for policing the contract 117 and will be needed for future
bargaining,118 the Board has held that the employer must furnish this type
of data notwithstanding the signing of a contract. 1 9
CONCLUSION
The lack of a specific statutory provision on disclosure has not inhib-
ited the Board from requiring employers to comply with union requests
for information. On the contrary, the indefiniteness of the statute has
enabled the Board to develop its own concepts of what the obligation to
bargain entails. 12  To a large extent the subjective "good faith" approach
that characterized the early cases is giving way to the evolution of objec-
tively-determined rules for disclosure. The latter development is prob-
ably inevitable, not only because the "good faith" requirement provides
no standard for determining what information should be furnished but
also because it fails to allow for the situation in which disclosure would be
harmful to the employer. Moreover, an objective analysis is more con-
sistent with the underlying argument in these cases that the union needs
the information if it is to bargain intelligently. It therefore seems de-
sirable to disregard the subjective approach altogether and require dis-
closure wherever the union's need for the information outweighs the harm
which might thereby result to the employer.
C. S.
117. See F. W. Woolworth Co., 109 N.L.R.B. 196 (1954), enforcement denied,
235 F.2d 319 (9th Cir. 1956).
118. See E. W. Scripps Co., 94 N.L.R.B. 227, 229 (1951).
119. Boston Herald-Traveler Corp., 110 N.L.R.B. 2097 (1954), enforcement
granted, 223 F.2d 58 (1st Cir. 1955) ; F. W. Woolworth Co., 109 N.L.R.B. 196 (1954),
enforcement denied, 235 F.2d 319 (9th Cir. 1956); Post Publishing Co., 102 N.L.R.B.
648 (1953); Hearst Corp., 102 N.L.R.B. 637 (1953).
120. It was argued by management as recently as 1955 that Congress, in enacting
a definition of collective bargaining in § 8(d) of the Taft-Hartley Act, had removed
from the NLRB any power to formulate or apply its own definition of the term "to
bargain collectively" and had overruled those decisions of the courts and the NLRB
which had conceived the duty to bargain as more than to "meet ... and confer
.... " See Hugh J. Baker & Co., 112 N.L.R.B. 828 (1955). It is true that some parts
of the original House bill would have had such effect. H.R. 3020, 80th Cong., 1st Sess.
§ 2(11) (1947) ; see H.R. RtP. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 7, 19-23 (1947). How-
ever, as finally enacted § 8(d) specifically affected only those prior decisions involving
failure to agree to a proposal or to make concessions. See S. RP. No. 105, 80th Cong.,
1st Sess. 24 (1947); H.R. CONF. RZ. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 34-35 (1947).
Although the NLRB observed that this management argument was not "so clearly
lacking in merit as to warrant its summary rejection" by the trial examiner on the
ground that it ignored the "good faith" requirement, the Board concluded that § 8(d)
was otherwise declaratory of existing law and that it effected no change in the em-
ployer's obligation to furnish information. Hugh J. Baker & Co., supra at 829.
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